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ABSTRACT. The notion of nation is quite recent. It is intertwined with that of equal 
citizenship and nationality, the aim of the state is to uniform those who are going to 
become its citizens, under a homogenous state design. But it is this process of state 
uniformity that is flawed: state’s mechanisms of categorization result from a process of 
inclusion and exclusion—majority and minority—that cannot help but create 
marginalization. For this reason, gypsies, vagrants, nomads and pastoralists (Berbers 
and Bedouins) become national minorities to be controlled under the majoritarian 
power of the state. Because “all majoritarianisms have in them the seeds of genocide” 
(Appadurai 2006: 57), states tend to pursue a policy of ethnic cleansing in order to 
eliminate the dirty spots from their national purity. On the basis of this consideration, 
the case of the Palestinian Arab Bedouin is an example of how the state can control, 
suffocate and cleanse its own national minorities and ethnic groups. 
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Our land abandoned us, we did not abandon her.  
We’ll pasture our livestock, and follow it.  
  — Bedouin proverb 
 
Introduction 
The Bedouin are part of the national imaginary in Jordan and play a significant part in 
surrounding states such as Syria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The Palestinian Arab Bedouin 
are part of the infamous history of indigenous tribes fallen under the exploitative invasion 
of new settlers who, in order to establish their home, have expropriated those of the older 
inhabitants. In the course of this paper, Palestinian Arab Bedouin and Bedouins will be 
used interchangeably as synonyms. 
There are many different groups of Bedouin in the Negev region of southern Israel 
where their presence goes back 7,000 years, some are still nomadic and they derive their 
livelihood from grazing and herding (Finkelstein and Perevolotsky 1990: 67-69). Prior to 
the birth of the State of Israel in 1948, many Bedouin in the region abandoned their 
nomadic way of life, becoming largely sedentary by establishing themselves in villages 
and developing a system of land ownership based on individual and communal rights 
(Human Rights Watch [HRW] 2008: 1). The 1948 War caused the expulsion of Bedouin 
in certain cases, and flight for others to the surrounding areas of the West Bank (Jordan), 
Gaza and Egypt. As a result, only 19 tribes remained in the Negev, which have since 
grown to 170,000 inhabitants (HRW 2008: 16). Due to discriminatory policies 
implemented by the Israeli government, the Bedouin have endured decades of 
segregation, faced forcible removal into restricted areas, experienced home demolitions, 
and ongoing internal displacement.  Victims of what resemble a process of ethnic 
cleansing, the survival of the Palestinian Arab Bedouin is seriously hampered by a state 
whose “members are persecuted for who they are, not what they have done” (Fein 2007: 
132). 
The case of the Palestinian Arab Bedouin has been the point of departure for a reflection 
on the effects of a society whom the state wants to regulate. Given that the notion of 
nation is quite recent, societies that states want to govern are usually older and have 
developed over a considerable period amount of time. As such, they generally have a 
series of traditions, customs and relationships that are difficult to operate within a state 
system which imposes its ascendance from above. The idea of nation is intertwined with 
that of “equal citizenship” (Scott 1998: 32) and nationality where the aim of the state is to 
create unity among those who are going to become its citizens. But it is this process of 
state uniformity that is flawed: a nation’s mechanisms of categorization result from a 
process of inclusion and exclusion, majority and minority, that cannot help but create 
marginalization. For this reason, gypsies, vagrants, nomads and pastoralists (Berbers and 
Bedouins) become national minorities to be controlled under the majoritarian power of 
the state. Because, “all majoritarianisms have in them the seeds of genocide” (Appadurai 
2006: 57), states tend to pursue a policy of ethnic cleansing in order to eliminate the dirty 
spots from their national purity. Majoritarianism, as argued by Michael Mann, refers to 
majoritarian democracy frameworks that in extreme cases legitimize genocide and ethnic 
cleansing (Mann 2005). On the basis of this consideration, the case of the Palestinian 
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Arab Bedouin is an example of how the state can control, suffocate, and cleanse its own 
minorities. 
 
Legibility and Manipulation: A State Policy of (Under)Development 
Legibility and manipulation are the binomial and often the basis for the construction of 
the modern-state. In his eye-opening work, Seeing like a State, James C. Scott (1998: 2) 
defines legibility as the need of a state to schematize its units in order to render them 
visible, or from Scott’s point of view, legible and thus easily manipulable. Land, people 
and languages are some of the units chosen by the state to impose its variety of 
centralizing mechanisms. The modern-state asks to see and to be seen in order to fulfil its 
basic purposes of “taxation, conscription and prevention of rebellion” (Scott 1998: 2). 
Due to the rationalizing effort enforced from above, a state does not take into 
consideration a range of invisible factors that are impossible to codify but that are still 
part of the society it wants to rule. A cadastral map focuses on the demarcation of its 
borders and not on what the borders contain, leaving out the knowledge of the locals 
whose presence is prior to that of the state. The authoritarian implementation of a legible 
uniformity usually denies diversity (Scott 1998: 18), which can lead to marginalization of 
certain minorities and threatens the well-being of others. 
 
The Inequalities of ʻan equal citizenshipʼ 
This bias, that some have rightly defined as ethnocentric (Preston 1996: 174), has 
universally exported Western “distinctions between those who belong and those who do 
not” (Weiner 1993: 1737), which are embedded in the nature itself of the modern nation-
state (Appadurai 2006: 49-50). The motivation of the state to classify and homogenize its 
populace is contemporary to industrialization and “disembedding mechanisms” (Giddens 
1991: 53) of a production line. Similarly, the idea of an “equal citizenship” (Scott 1998: 
32) may generate legible citizens but fails to generate equal ones since a state’s 
mechanisms of categorization result from a process of inclusion and exclusion – majority 
and minority – that cannot help but create marginalization. As pointed out by Arjun 
Appadurai (2006: 49), minorities and majorities are “recent historical inventions, 
essentially tied up with ideas about nations, populations, representation, and enumeration 
which are no more than a few centuries old”. States are usually younger than the societies 
they want to govern (Scott 1998: 183) which have grown regardless of the state’s 
administrative design. It is not surprising that the bulk of history, customs, and relations 
within certain societies are perceived as uncivilized elements that must be torn down by 
the centralizing force of the state. The Bedouin do not fit Western norms and are 
generally unmanageable, making control over them severe or not feasible at all. It goes 
without saying why the state, whose prerogative is immobility, has always tried to 
domesticate the gypsies, vagrants, nomads and pastoralists (Berbers and Bedouins) with 
sedentarization plans in order to make them legible and manipulable (Scott 1998: 184).  
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The Fear of Minorities  
As we have seen so far, marginalization is often the consequence of the state’s efforts to 
produce a homogenous national majority (Scott 1998: 76). 
When a state imposes itself on an existing society, it proves the basis for Ole Waever’s 
theory of securitization. To distinguish Waever’s theory from a simple theory of 
politicization, any security threat directed at state sovereignty or society is taken as the 
principle that empowers the state to use exceptional means of authority to protect national 
security. This extraordinary measure would not be used solely for political interest, 
through security justifications, as more socially acceptable, stretched by the state’s scope 
of activities. Although society and state are generally two sides of the same coin, Waever 
(1995: 13) hypothesizes their difference, so that state security is what protects a state 
against a threat to its sovereignty, while societal security is what protects a community 
against a threat to its identity. Waever argues that the fear of nation-states being 
challenged by transnational actors in the global era involves fear of the society’s identity, 
including from migration (Castles and Miller 2009: 30-31). It is not a coincidence that the 
migrants of Waever’s analysis and the nomadic groups discussed in the previous section, 
who both share the condition of being “uprooted” (Mallki 1992: 25), have been 
securitized by the state as a threat. Despite their “small numbers” (Appadurai 2006: 49), 
the image of a minority that is a threat to the majority is part of the modern political 
discourse and derives from the elemental ‘we vs. they’ sociological theory which 
stigmatizes the they in order “to set the boundaries … of the we” (Appadurai 2006: 50). 
 
The Dark Side of Democracy: Ethnocracy 
Ethnocracy is a form of ruling where one ethnic group holds a privileged position over 
the rest (Yiftachel 2006: 9). A state that develops a policy focused on nationalist and 
racial identities and implements a campaign that stirs fear among the majority of the 
minority group, could turn into a genocidal ethnocratic regime and pursue a plan of 
ethnic cleansing (Appadurai 2006: 59). An ethnocratic regime is often found on a 
geopolitical map but it is seldom studied. The main objective of such a regime is to 
maximize ethnic control over contested territory and expand its authority apparatus.          
A developed control system is typical for ethnocracies and is used to maintain a 
dominant position of one ethnic group and is regarded as necessary to exercise control of 
the legal, institutional, and power instruments (Yiftachel 2006: 11). A dominant, charter 
ethnoclass may take possession of the state apparatus and it becomes the authority in the 
process of decision making for most public policies. Ethnocratic regimes may emerge in 
a variety of forms, including cases of ethnic dictatorships which often implement 
strategies of ethnic cleansing on indigenous persons. 
 
Ethnos and Thanatos: What Lies Behind Ethnic Cleansing 
As national uniformity has become the basis for the modern nation-state, the recurrence 
of ethnic cleansing has doubled so much that UN Special Rapporteurs, A.S. Al- 
Khasawneh and R. Hatano, in their 1993 Report, The Human Rights Dimensions of 
Population Transfer, has defined the 20th century “as the century of the displaced”.1 
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The removal of “an ‘undesirable’ population from a given territory due to religious or 
ethnic discrimination, political, strategic or ideological considerations, or a combination 
of these” (Bell-Fialkoff 2004: 110) is a characteristic of modernity and of a “politicized” 
nationalism (Mann 2005: 3). Appadurai describes this as “the anxiety of incompleteness” 
as a result of the majority becoming predatory towards the small numbers (Appadurai 
2006: 8). Institutions such as “citizenship, democracy, and welfare” (Mann 2005: 3) are 
in fact based on national and ethnic principles, frequently justified by a “rhetoric of state 
security” (Mulaj 2007: 336). As pointed out by Mann (2005: 3), ethnic cleansing is the 
dark side of democracy, since in our times the original meaning of the word democracy 
(rule by the people) has ended up to combine, or confuse, demos (masses, people) with 
ethnos (ethnic group). As a result, Mann (2005: 18) argues that the majority of 
contemporary states—today “70 % of the population consider itself to be of one 
ethnicity”—are “mono-ethnic” and thus stem from a process of ethnic cleansing. 
States are able to pursue a literal elimination of national minorities “rendering an area 
ethnically homogenous” (Cohen 1999 cited in Fein 2007: 152). The method of ethnic 
cleansing becomes a tool which is utilized to achieve “nation-state creation” (Preece 
1998: 818) as “genocide, after all, is an exercise in community-building” (Gourevich 
1999 cited in Appadurai 2006: 7). The notion of ethnic cleansing is often confused with 
that of genocide, or “1) alternative to genocide, 2) a step toward genocide, 3) the means 
of genocide” (Fein 2007: 152), but there is not any link between the use of these two 
words and the enormity of a massacre (Blum, Stanton, Sagi, and Richter 2007: 206). 
Ethnic cleansing on a wider scale includes cultural suppression, tactics of control, such as 
detaining persons for movement, employment restrictions and limited access to 
education, housing, medicine and food to list a few. The attention dedicated to the use of 
the word ‘ethnic cleansing’ is not simply a linguistic exercise, but originates from an 
awareness that the reason ethnic cleansing has not been recognized and prevented over 
time comes from the failure of labelling it (Fein 2007: 154). 
Since the use of the expression has become popular amongst journalist, politicians, 
NGOs and UN bodies, it has shed new light on the phenomenon of forcible removal that 
occurred prior to modern times and that only now can be framed as ethnic cleansing. 
From this historical perspective it appears that ethnic cleansing dates far back in time and 
has “only intensified in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries” (Bell-Fialkoff 2004: 
110). 
The expulsion of Jews from central Europe in the Middle Ages was a cleansing that 
targeted religious minorities. The first cleansing based on ethnic justifications was 
executed by England in the 1650s with the expulsion of the Irish Catholic population 
from Ulster (Bell-Fialkoff 2004: 112). The 18th century was witness to the gradual 
expulsion of the native American population by the white settlers while the 19th century 
saw the elimination of the Armenian minorities by Turkey which was presented for the 
first time as the final stage of a state policy of ethnic discrimination (Bell-Fialkoff 2004: 
113). In the 20th century, the vicious plan of the Nazi policy of ethnic purity aimed at 
annihilating the Jews (Junderein): first in Germany, then emptying some of the European 
territories (see the case of Poland) to create Lebensraum for the German settlers, and 
finally to render the whole of Europe (and even the whole world) Junderein by 
submitting the ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe to Hitler’s occupation (Mulaj 2007: 
342). After the World War II, the Potsdam Protocol of 1945 authorized the Allies to 
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remove an estimated 14 million Germans from Eastern Europe to what is considered “the 
largest and most sweeping ethnic cleansing in history” (Bell-Fialkoff 2004: 115), whereas 
the cleansing based on economic class characterized Stalinist Russia and Maoist China. 
This history of cleansing paved the way to what occurred in Bosnia and Croatia in the 
early 1990s, where the term ethnic cleansing has its roots. It comes in fact from Croato-
Serbian etnicko ciscenje and it was used for the first time by the Yugoslav National Army 
(JNA) to refer to the ethnic violence of the Kosovars towards the Serbs (Preece 1998: 
820). The atrocious warfare operations were undertaken by JNA with support of Croatia’s 
Serb nationalist party, to ethnically cleanse Krajina, a part of Croatia declared to be 
Serbian (Gagnon 2004: 4). This violent campaign aimed at the removal of non-Serbs did 
not end once all non-Serbs were expelled. The bloodshed at this time was directed at 
moderate Serbs in the region of Krajina who condemned the Belgrade-allied Krajina 
leadership. Most of the people in opposition to the leadership were prosecuted, oppressed, 
or sometimes killed (Gagnon 2004: 5). This reminiscence of fratricidal slaughter (and 
other events from the Balkan wars) is often omitted and divergent in scholarships on 
ethnic-based conflicts in the Balkan region. As Philip Gagnon claims, explaining the 
violence of the 1990s Yugoslav wars is a puzzle in a number of ways, not limited to the 
ethnically-based elucidation of violence (Gagnon 2004: 6). 
It appears that ethnic cleansing has come into shape and has accompanied the 
modernization and democratization of the world, given that “its past lay mainly among 
Europeans, who invented the democratic nation-state.… Now the epicentre of ethnic 
cleansing has moved into the South of the world” (Mann 2005: 5). 
“Discrimination and prejudice” (Bell-Fialkoff 2004: 120) have remained the triggering 
forces, while “sanitation and disease” (Blum et al. 2007: 205) are still the leitmotif that 
drive a “predatory identity” (Appadurai 2006: 51) to cleanse a minoritarian one. As Mann 
states, “Ethnicity is not objective” (Mann 2005: 10), every group can claim to have 
common culture and ancestors—i.e., the two premises an ethnic group usually relies on.  
Yet, at the same time every group can arbitrarily claim to be mandated to purify itself by 
destroying another, and in the case of ethnic cleansing, “the enemy to be annihilated is 
the whole people” (Mann 2005: 3). 
 
Historical Background 
The name Bedouin is derived from the Arabic term badawi, which translates to “a 
nomadic inhabitant of the desert who depends for his livelihood on herds of camel and 
sheep” (Marx 1967: 3). The Bedouin historically would move between the Negev desert, 
the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt, and southern Jordan for grazing land and to pursue a 
nomadic way of life.  The Bedouin are an indigenous group recognized for their ancestral 
ties to the land in the Negev region by rootedness that pre-dates the settlement of most of 
the population living there today. In 1900, the Ottoman government established the 
largest city, Beer Sheva, as the administrative centre in the Negev, which is often referred 
to as the capital city of the region. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire, in the beginning 
of the twentieth century, made way for the British authorities to maintain law and order in 
the region; however, the British intervened minimally in Bedouin affairs (Marx 1967: 
11). 
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The Bedouin’s situation was the result of the Zionist2 ambition to create a homeland for 
the Jewish populace on the Palestinian Mandate territory. This movement led to the 
establishment of Israel in 1948, when British Mandate was withdrawn. Control over the 
territory was achieved through occupation of the Palestinian cities and villages by Jewish 
troops and expulsion of the indigenous population, this severely affected the Bedouin’s 
culture and coexistence (Piotrowski 1983: 95). In 1948, before the outbreak of the war, 
the Bedouin-Arab population ranged between 60,000 and 90,000 people. At the end of 
the war, most of the tribes were expelled to Jordan (West Bank), the Gaza Strip and the 
Sinai (Egypt), and only about 11,000 Arab Bedouin remained within the new Israeli state 
boundaries (Noach 2009: 2). In 1951, military rule was imposed on the remaining 
nineteen Negev Bedouin tribes and concentrated in a closed area of about 1,000 square 
kilometres in the northern Negev region.  The Bedouin remained under military rule until 
its withdrawal in 1966 (Abu-Rabia 2002: 203); thus, the Israeli government decided to 
sedenterize and urbanize the Bedouin in seven planned townships (Noach 2009: 3). 
Dispossession of the Bedouin’s land was based on the Land Acquisition Law of 1953, 
which gave the state the right to acquire land that had not been registered in The Land 
Registry Office up until April 1952 (Abu-Ras 2006: 3). Under the 1965 Planning and 
Building Law almost all of the land was categorized as agricultural, making the villages 
unrecognized and all the buildings were labeled ‘illegal’ (Noach 2009: 4). In the 
aftermath of the Six-Days War in 1967,3 Israel had extended expropriation of land from 
the Bedouin not only within its state, but also in the Occupied Territory. 
 
The Expropriation of Bedouinʼs Land 
The highly centralized system of ownership and control of the land by the Israeli 
government is basically responsible for every activity that covers allocating, planning 
and developing the 93 per cent of the land under its possession (HRW 2008: 27). While 
some parts of land are directly owned by the state, others are owned by governmental 
agencies such as the Development Authority (DA) and the Jewish National Fund (JNF).  
The former (DA), founded in 1952, administers the lands of Palestinian refugees in order 
to make them available for the development of new settlements. On the other hand, the 
JNF was founded in 1901 and is in charge of obtaining land for Jewish settlers. A third 
governmental body, the Israel Land Administration (ILA) administers all of the land. 
Land is state-property; it cannot be sold but leased to individuals or institutions for 49 or 
98 years through ILA (HRW 2008: 27). Although the sale of state land is prohibited by 
law, the law itself permits the state to transfer its own land to the JNF. If we consider that 
with the 1950 Absentee’s Property Law, the JNF sequestered 78 per cent of the land of 
the Palestinian refugees who fled the 1948 war, and if we consider that 10 out of 22 
members that compose the ILA’s governing council represent the JNF (the other 11 are 
represented by government ministries), it is evident that the JNF owns the majority of 
land and exercise a certain influence on Israeli’s policy of land access and allocation. As 
a consequence, and in reality, Palestinian Arab citizens who are legally entitled to lease 
land owned by the state and not transferred to the JNF encounter a lot of difficulties 
accessing the land since they are closed off from leasing 80 per cent of state owned land.4 
The obstructionist policy suffered by the Bedouin in terms of land expropriation, 
including the relocation of people and displacement, is part of a broader picture that 
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involves the Palestinian Arab community in general. Besides the Absentee’s Property 
Law, the Israeli government has carried out several laws that have impounded the land 
traditionally owned by the Palestinian and the Arab Bedouin population (HRW 2008: 
29). 
 
The Displacement of the Bedouin 
A state has numerous responsibilities and duties to fulfill for its citizens – foremost of 
which is to offer security and protection. Displacement may occur in times of urgency 
when a state needs to secure and protect its citizens from war, violence and natural 
disaster, yet the populace should be able to return once the emergency ceases to exist.  
The Palestinian Arab Bedouin have a lengthy history of mobility, which is not connected 
to these instances of non-voluntary movement but due to their tribal traditions and 
nomadic pastoralist lifestyle. Individuals who are forcibly displaced from their residence 
may become a recognized vulnerable person under the definition of a refugee or an 
internally displaced person. 
For centuries, the Bedouin in the Negev were freely able to live their nomadic lifestyle 
and endured a ‘world without time’ under the Ottoman Empire and the British Mandate 
(Goering 1979: 3).5 The creation of international borders and the restriction on 
individual’s movement by the modern state did alter the Bedouin’s nomadic patterns of 
migration from moving villages and land seasonally to settling for longer periods within 
different regions until the land was no longer fertile. “Although under the Ottoman 
Empire and British Mandate some of the Bedouin could be classified as having reached a 
semi-nomadic stage, this process of sedentarization was forcefully accelerated to a 
considerable degree after the founding of the State of Israel” (Goering 1979: 3). The 
1948 al-Nakba6 catastrophe for the Palestinians marks the beginning of the internal 
displacement and movement to the eastern Negev. The state’s control of the Bedouin 
from 1948 to 1967, was enforced by the Israeli military laws and rule which only applied 
to the Arab population and confined them to remain in the Siyag areas, restricting their 
access to citizenship and public services (Koeller 2006: 38). Movement of Bedouin 
under military rule was further restricted by military permits which were the only way to 
allow them to leave or enter the towns and villages. 
 
In order to acquire Israeli citizenship, each Bedouin had to affiliate with a 
recognised tribe regardless of their original genealogy. They have subsequently 
been forced to sedentarise and relocate to seven officially-sanctioned state-
planned townships. The Bedouin are offered subsidised plots of land, access to 
water, electricity, roads, medical facilities and schools – under the condition that 
they agree to locate to the approved townships and abandon claims to land 
elsewhere in the Negev. (Koeller 2006: 38) 
 
For the Bedouin to settle into the state-planned townships would directly result in 
ethnic-cleansing that would ultimately alter their traditional culture as semi-nomadic and 
eliminate the possibility to ever regain their unique pastoralist livelihoods. As a result, 
the Bedouin that did not voluntarily move to the planned townships, instead they 
remained in illegal settlements which were not recognized by the Israeli government -  
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even if they existed prior to 1948. This violates their rights and access to land under 
international law and according to human rights standards (Koeller 2006: 38). 
 
The Structural and Cultural Discrimination Toward the Bedouin 
The Israeli state is arguably a state that does not uphold the values of a modern liberal 
state in the sense that it adversely affects ethnically-distinctive minority groups, it is 
characteristic of overrepresentation of the Jewish population, and it has an unequal 
democracy system for all state functions (Smooha 1995, as cited in Yonah, Abu-Saad, 
and Kaplan 2004: 392). Yiftachal (2006: 38) does not define the Israeli regime as a 
democracy but describes its political system as an ethnocracy, in which the adherence to 
certain ethno-group shapes the distribution of rights, wealth, power and resources. 
The Jewish desire to have their own state for one ethno-cultural group has driven 
prejudice toward others, who are subsequently excluded by ethno-nationalist logic. In 
contrast to democratic regimes, Israel exercises land policy that secures control over all 
territories and provides special economic benefits only to charter group members, which 
does not protect the collective rights of minorities. 
The control and oppression of Bedouin on occupied Palestinian territory has become 
feasible by development of tools/means designated to exercise an efficient domination. 
Central to the achievement of solid control over minority groups is a system of 
“segmentation, dependence, co-option” and denial of rights, which are designed to fully 
subordinate them to the state authority (Yonah et al. 2004: 392). 
The urbanization plan of the Negev, which was conducted by Israel through the 1965 
Planning and Building Law, planned to sedenterize Palestinian Arab Bedouin into seven 
towns and remove the rest from the Negev desert for Jewish settlements (HRW 2008: 
14). Such a state policy embraces isolation and segregation between the Bedouin and 
Israeli Jewish citizens on a cultural, political and administrative level. The semi-nomadic 
Bedouin tribe’s culture, identity and traditions were seriously jeopardized. It should also 
be mentioned that no agreements were initiated for the displacement of the population, 
including no provisions for basic education and economic organization. The act to 
deprive one group of their ancestral land and providing the same land for a privileged 
ethnic group is only one of the many signs of a discriminatory policy toward the Bedouin. 
Given that the Palestinian Bedouin lost both the opportunity to graze their herds and 
live off the soil, they fell into a severe livelihood quandary. This led them to become the 
most impecunious and most disadvantaged ethnic group in Israel, where 66 per cent of 
Bedouin live below the poverty line and up to 80 per cent reside in unrecognized villages 
(Radwan 2011). This situation is the result of various economic, legal and political 
factors. 
The Beer Sheva region is inhabited by 608,800 people, including 188,900 Arab 
nationals (170,000 are identified as Bedouin) according to Central Bureau of Statistics 
information published in 2010.7 Equal representation of the Bedouin population within 
the Negev government offices is not only a democratic obligation, but also a significant 
means to enable economic development. The Israeli state is obliged to reach 10 per cent 
employment of minorities in state offices by the end of 2012.8 The principle of adequate 
representation was introduced to secure the participation of minorities and avoid 
structural discrimination in public administration (Yonah et al. 2004: 382). The Arab 
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population is under-represented in the Israeli civil service in general, and the Bedouin in 
the Beer Sheva region are the most underrepresented group (Rotem and Noach 2011: 5). 
The Negev Coexistence Forum for Civil Equality prepared a report on Structural and 
Cultural Discrimination Against Arab Bedouin in the Negev with a focus on the number 
of Arab Bedouin employed in government offices and the accessibility to governmental 
services.9 Their findings are alarming in the sense of ethnic inequality. It appears that 
only 197 Arab Bedouin are employed in government offices and agencies out of 5,217 
overall employees. They account for 3.7 per cent of employees in the Negev region, as 
shown by data as of 17 March 2011 (Rotem and Noach 2011: 9-10).  Lastly, the 
employment rate of Arab Bedouin in the ministerial offices is slightly higher with a 6.4 
percent Arab Bedouin representation, but still far from a desired level (Rotem and Noach 
2011: 9). The Bedouin compose around 31 per cent of the whole Negev population, 
whereas such a representation is not even close to an equal employment rate.10 
 
The Ethnic-Cleansing of the Bedouin 
What was analyzed in the preceding sections is perfectly summed up by Michael Mann’s 
recognition of three distinct phases in the process of ethnic cleansing: economic 
discrimination, geographical segregation, and cultural suppression. 
Mann (2005: 14) distinguishes an initial policy of discrimination, often economic and 
material, that constrains the rights of what he calls the ‘out-group’. In this case, the ‘out-
group’ is the Bedouin who are continuously discriminated against in terms of land 
ownership by the Israeli government (the so-called ‘in-group’). The latter is also 
responsible of what Mann defines as geographical segregation, or in our term, 
displacement. This is shown first by ‘ghettoization’ where the Bedouin are put into the 
Siyag and next, by way of settling or being forced into the government planned 
townships. In his analysis of ethnic cleansing, Mann differentiates between policies of 
total cleansing and partial cleansing. Discrimination and segregation can be considered 
partial; whereas “‘cultural suppression’ involves total cleansing” – which is demonstrated 
by the institutional suffocation of the cultural identity of the Bedouin “whose identity is 
thus forcibly assimilated into the dominant group” (Mann 2005: 14). 
All these together, with a policy of economic development designed to be implemented 
in areas inhabited by indigenous tribes, are “warning signs” of an ethnic cleansing in 
progress (Fein 2007: 154). 
 
Land and Ethnic Cleansing 
According to Mann, land is not “the main cause of ethnic cleansing…. Yet this is not true 
where markets are limited by outright monopolies, either in highly statist economies or in 
exclusionary land ownership” (Mann 2005: 31). The centralized system of ownership and 
control of the land which characterizes the Israeli government is typical of an ethnocratic 
regime that wants to dominate on a given territory in order to increase its economic 
growth at the expense of a minority. “Land ownership is also inherently monopolistic. 
Unlike capital or labour, land is finite” (Mann 2005: 31). The reason for this is the 
exclusionary policy of Israel that is based on ethnic category which automatically 
excludes the Bedouin from owning their land. If we consider that herding, grazing and 
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small agrarian activities of other kinds are the basis of the Bedouin economy, we can 
easily imagine how this could seriously hamper their lives. Therefore, the cleansing of an 
ethnic minority is the goal of an ethnocracy whose aim is to establish its mono-ethnic 
territory. The removal of the ethnic minority is thus the most effective way to achieve 
this, as demonstrated by what is occurring in the lands of the Negev (Preece 1998: 821). 
 
Displacement and Ethnic Cleansing  
Internal displacement is recognized globally as a violation of human rights, yet it 
continues to occur to the most vulnerable and weakest groups whom are ethnic minorities 
and indigenous populations. In fact, this is legitimate when examining the Palestinian 
Arab Bedouin. The Israeli state must adhere to international law by conducting the 
movement of persons non-violently, without causing trauma to the displaced, and only in 
extraordinary emergency circumstances. The geographical segregation described by 
Mann (2005: 14) as “the out-group is ghettoized in apartheid or enslaved conditions” 
offers reasons to believe that the state’s removal of the inhabitants from the unrecognized 
villages is indirectly linked to ethnic-cleansing of the Bedouin. 
The Palestinian Arab Bedouin have been recognized as having ancestral ties to the land 
that the government is evicting them from.11 Instead of offering the Bedouin land 
settlement agreements, the state provides them with homes in planned villages which 
undermines their nomadic way of living.  “These towns symbolize ... neglect in which the 
Arab residents of the Negev have lived from the moment they relinquished their land. Yet 
while they remain on the land, the state invests considerable resources in transferring 
them elsewhere, rather than addressing their problems and realizing their rights in their 
places of residence” (Almi 2005: 1). The remedies provided by the ‘in-group’ are 
consciously perpetuating the alteration and destruction of a minority within its territories 
by encouraging the segregation and marginalization of the Bedouin. The decision by the 
state to undermine durable solutions causes an irreversible effect on the youth who cannot 
predict if they will have a future ahead of them as Bedouin. Since the home demolition 
orders are carried out spontaneously once they are issued, the Bedouin never know if 
their home will be there when they return, thus creating a state of uncertainty and 
constant fear, especially amongst the new generation (Almi 2005: 3). 
Consequently, the young Bedouin live with the effects of displacement by way of 
changing their traditions and livelihoods, which ultimately impacts human development.  
Furthermore, Article 27(3) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides the right 
for all children at the national level to have access to the same social programmes and 
assistance, and in particular, to nutrition, clothing, and housing (Convention on the Rights 
of the Child 1989).  The Israeli government has focused on controlling the Bedouin rather 
than working to resolve land disputes for the sake of the children, or abiding by the said 
Convention. It goes without saying that the Israeli policy puts the future of the Bedouin at 
stake. 
 
Structural and Cultural Discrimination and Ethnic Cleansing 
As indicated, the tragic condition of Bedouin unity, culture maintenance, and the 
preservation of traditions have been seriously jeopardized by the ethnic policies of the 
Kamil Qandil, Nicolò Di Marzo, and Katherine Walkiewicz                                     IJIS Vol. 8, No. 1, 2012 
 52 
Israeli government. “Cultural apartheid and liquidation of the most rudimentary attributes 
of human rights” toward the Bedouin minority has led to the absolute dominance of one 
ethnic group and has seriously endangered these pastoral tribes (Clarimont 1996: 2592). 
Ethnic cleansing is often symbolized by involuntary population transfer determined by 
“ethnicity [race, language, religion, culture, etc.]” to seize control over a certain area; 
“thereby cleansing that territory of a particular group has been an instrument of nation-
state creation” (Preece 1998: 818). In the case of the Bedouin, not only have they been 
displaced as an unwanted ethnic group, they have also been perceived as a security threat 
to cultural and ethnic unity. The Israeli policy exhibits ethnic cleansing and shows how 
the creation of one ethno-state is accomplished, regardless of the repercussion on the 
indigenous population. “Cultural suppression” is one of the ethnic cleansing tools which 
involves forcible assimilation of identity and the abandonment of language and religion 
(Mann 2005: 14). All of these practices appear in the policy directed at the Bedouin; they 
are effectively denied the right to practice their religion and to attend the mosque 
(NCFCE 2006: 15). 
Arabic is one of the official languages in Israel; however, there are hardly any signs in 
Arabic seen in government offices within the Beer Sheva region, which is populated by a 
significant number of Bedouin (NCFCE 2006: 15).  The state policy aims at impairing the 
identity and weakening Bedouin ties with the Palestinian population (Yonah et al. 2004: 
393). Ethnic cleansing employs tactics to control minorities who “may simply be rounded 
up, detained, and deported; or their movement may be the result of other, more indirect 
measures” (Preece 1998: 822). Given that these tactics have been implemented upon the 
Bedouin, their traditional lifestyle has been utterly threatened. In addition, cultural ethnic 
cleansing can be composed of “work restrictions; restricted access to education, housing, 
medicine, food, or humanitarian aid, forced labor, confiscation of property” (Preece 1998: 
822). According to a Human Rights Watch (2001) report, education measures including 
the enrolment level in secondary school, the number of graduates, and dropout rates of 
the Bedouin in the Negev are far worse in comparison with the Jewish population, but 
also with Palestinian Arab students. Furthermore, merely 6.4 per cent of Bedouin students 
qualified for university admission, whereas more than 40 per cent of the Jewish students 
were able to commence university education (HRW 2001: 23). Not only are educational 
possibilities constrained, but so is access to medical care facilities and the chance to enter 
the labour market. Apart from cultural and structural discrimination, the lack of economic 
opportunities and shortage of essential social services severely breach Palestinian 
Bedouin rights and lead to definitive ethnic cleansing. 
 
ANALYSIS 
At this point, we address the question: How are state policies of control used as a tool of 
ethnic cleansing of certain minority groups? Here the discussion shows how 
expropriation, displacement, structural, and cultural discrimination lead to the ethnic 
cleansing of certain minorities, particularly the Bedouin of the Negev.  
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Land: Expropriated and Re-shaped 
One of the consequences of modernization has been generally referred to as 
commodification, which is (basically) a process that transforms every aspect of our daily 
life into goods. For the Bedouin, who directly take their livelihoods from the land and 
consider it their source of survival, the identification with the land becomes inseparable.  
The expropriation of land becomes life threatening, and therefore an efficient tool of 
ethnic cleansing. As long as land can be commodified, it can also be re-sized, which is 
the case in the Palestinian territories that risk being ‘re-customized’ as well as having 
irreversible effects. The ancestral ties claimed by the Palestinian Bedouin are not enough 
to stop the persistence of Israel to have full control over the land, even though this could 
lead to the annihilation of the Bedouin minority population in general. 
Since the term “natural environment” has been replaced by the term “natural resources”, 
nature has started to be perceived as a useful tool for human exploitation: the natural 
“habitat” has disappeared, superseded by “economic resources to be managed efficiently 
and profitably” (Harrison 1993: 121). The commodification process has affected the 
uniqueness of the Bedouin tribes: given their pastoralist way of living, the Bedouin 
identify themselves with the land which is their source of livelihood (Harvey 2005: 165). 
As a result, the Bedouin are perceived as ineffectual and disadvantageous to development 
and their land is considered a product that can be easily expropriated. The Israeli 
government “relegated Palestinians to a separate (and backward) corner of the state” 
(Blecher 2005: 732) – this was generally directed towards Palestinians and specifically to 
the Bedouin. The same high-modern state ideology has regarded the pastoral Bedouin as 
“rural” and “underdeveloped”, a burden for the “industrial” and “modern” utilitarian state 
(Preston 1996: 172). 
By the same token, the Israeli government policy of commodification of land and 
discrimination against the Bedouin people has gradually and dramatically changed the 
size of their territories and re-shaped their boundaries. Ethnic cleansing is not always a 
massive expulsion that occurs in times of war, but often a progressive process that aims at 
the “revision of boundaries” for political reasons in times of non-war (Preece 1998: 822). 
In light of this consideration, it could be argued that the method used by the Israel 
government of managing and controlling the Bedouin is an attempt at changing the size 
of the Bedouin ancestral land which fits in a broader plan of irrevocably limiting the 
Palestinian territories. 
As passionately expressed by the first foreign minister of Palestine, Nabil Shaath, 
during his trip to Copenhagen: 
 
Israel should stop building his settlements in West Bank, they can build them in 
Israel. Land is vanishing under our feet piece by piece. If Israel wants to pursue 
its negotiations, this should stop. The settlements are changing the demographic 
scheme of Palestine, so when negotiations will finally take place, the borders 
will have a different shape. That’s probably why Netanyahu keeps saying that 
borders cannot be as those in 1967.12 
 
The persistence and desire of the Israeli state to have full control over the land has been 
clearly demonstrated via land legislation and private property rights. The Bedouin are at a 
disadvantage under Israeli property laws due to the simple fact that they do not hold a 
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land title or registration in the Negev or other surrounding areas. It must be understood 
that ever since Israel became a state in 1948, there has been a large Bedouin population 
living on the land whose presence dates back to 7,000 years. Thus, the protection of land 
for indigenous populations must be taken into account. In many settler countries like 
Canada and Australia, aboriginal peoples inhabited the land before the existence of the 
state. 
 
Uniforming Ethnicity 
From living freely in the Negev region to becoming segregated under the state’s crushing 
force, the Palestinian Arab Bedouin minority have suffered from a policy of segregation. 
This process of differentiation from the majority is based on ethnic ties since the Israeli 
nation-state has defined itself as a uniform mono-ethnicity. In practice, this has been 
translated into home demolitions and resettlement plans that do not take into 
consideration the Bedouin’s lifestyle and not even their existence. In fact, the Bedouin 
have had their survival further hampered by development projects that have excluded 
them from participation or involvement. 
Israeli officials have pursued a continuous policy of segregation by concentrating the 
Bedouin in a restricted geographical area. As for the Palestinians, the term “transfer”, 
which is also applied to the Bedouin, has been “revived, transformed, extended, 
mainstreamed” and commonly used as a euphemism for ethnic cleansing with the direct 
intention to obscure its true meaning (Blecher 2005: 728). 
The marginalization that a nation seeks to eliminate is paradoxically produced by the 
state itself since its policies of control often include exclusion. It could be argued then 
that the transformation of the Bedouin into a minority is the result of the notion of nation-
state which seeks homogeneity and suffocates diversity. Since the nation-state is based on 
uniform ethnicity, the ethnic cleansing becomes the means to shape a unitary nation-state. 
From this perspective, the case of the Bedouin is illustrative: the creation of the state of 
Israel has made them into a minority although their presence in the Negev is prior to 
1948. Furthermore, this gradual ethnic cleansing, reached through policies of 
dispossession and discrimination, is the consequence of the Israeli mono-ethnic design 
that is characterized by its reluctance to create a one-state solution which includes 
Palestinians and Israelis.13 
It appears that the Bedouin are a classic case of ‘they vs. we’ which emphasizes the 
opposition of the majority to the minority in a given state (Appadurai 2006: 50). It is also 
a form of validation where a positive process of linking, and a negative process of 
differentiating can be seen from the home demolition orders of unrecognized Bedouin 
villages and structures issued by the Israeli state (Hansen 2006: 17). The Israeli 
government has not adequately addressed the issue of land ownership, instead it has 
worked against the Bedouin with resettlement solutions (state planned townships) that are 
not appropriate for pastoral groups. The negative process of differentiating is pointed out 
in an interview with an Israeli lobbyist for the Bedouin in the United States.14 The 
lobbyist pointed out that as an Israeli citizen, she would never come home and find her 
house demolished like the Bedouin discover on a daily basis. Thus, returning to the 
negative process of differentiating, the Bedouins are visibly discriminated against within 
the laws on home demolition. 
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At the same time, as pointed out by Helen Fein (2007: 155), “isolation of indigenous 
people” and “economic development in indigenous areas” are considered as warning 
signs of ethnic cleansing. The isolation of the Bedouin in the Siyag first and in the 
government townships later, rendered the control of the Bedouin by the Israeli officials 
much easier and at the same time facilitated the construction of mega-projects 
surrounding the Bedouin settlements, as well as the implementation of Negev Plan 2015. 
However, it could be argued that a segregation of such entity has created the perfect 
condition for causing sickness of the Bedouin living there as shown in the increase of 
death deceases of cancer caused by the poisoned emissions of the toxic sites – thus, an 
ostensive example of how state policy of control can lead to ethnic cleansing. 
 
Prejudice: A Distorted Image 
The Israeli ideology has contributed to create an image of the Bedouin that does not 
correspond to reality. The Bedouin culture is not only seen as backward but also the 
Bedouin themselves are depicted as criminals that require the Israelis to be aware of. This 
biased perception has undermined the survival of the Bedouin who are not welcome in 
their own land. As a consequence, even the demographic upswing of the Bedouin 
population has been perceived as a problem that has to be controlled and suffocated at 
birth. 
Prejudice toward the Palestinian Arab Bedouin and the Palestinian population in general 
is also reflected by the official education language, public rhetoric and political 
terminology. Chief Rabin from the city of Safad urged for the removal of all Palestinians, 
defining them as “resident aliens” (Blecher 2005: 733). In 2002, two years after the 
spring of the Second Intifada,15 campaigns against Palestinians spread around the country: 
almost all walls, fences and signs were covered with posters declaring that “Transfer = 
Security and Peace”, which called for the expulsion of that group perceived as a danger to 
state sovereignty and stability (Blecher 2005: 743). Adverse portrayals of Palestinians  
can also be found in school books that depict them with prejudice and describe them “as 
vile and deviant and criminal, people who don’t pay taxes, people who live off the state, 
people who don’t want to develop”, as described by Peled-Elhanan, a professor of 
language at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Sherwood 2011). As a consequence, the 
perception of Palestinian Bedouin as similar to the Palestinian population is biased and 
rests on the profound belief that national security, stability and development is to be 
achieved via expulsion and ethnic cleansing of “undesirable minorities” (Mulaj 2007: 
336). 
The Bedouin are undesired and, as a result, so are their offspring. Thus, the 
demographic increase of the Bedouin is considered as a “population problem”, in which 
the Palestinians are included in general, and this has always been a concern for Israel 
(Pappe 2006: 250). The growth rate of the Palestinians has been stable and has recently 
increased, causing concern of an imbalance or a “demographic danger” for the Israeli 
authorities (Pappe 2006: 249). Given that the same is occurring among the Bedouin, the 
absence of medical care and health infrastructure and the resultant high rate of infant 
mortality could be easily seen as an intended instrument to keep the growth rate down. 
The control of the state becomes, in this case, a demographic control whose final solution 
is a definitive ethnic cleansing of the undesired ethnic minority. 
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Conclusion 
The privilege acquired by one ethno-group at the expense of a minority is the case of the 
Palestinian Arab Bedouin of the Negev. This demonstrates that the instrument of ethnic 
cleansing, disguised under the shape of state policies of control, could be murderous. The 
state, which is usually the guarantor of protection, may instead be the bearer of gradual 
oppression that can lead to the total elimination of the minority group. 
We have examined various aspects of the Israeli policy of control towards the Negev 
Bedouin. From land regime to racist discourse, the land and culture of the Bedouin has 
been constantly targeted by the Israeli government under the pretext of development. This 
led us to the conclusion that expropriation, displacement, and structural and cultural 
discrimination are the steps that are slowly cleansing the Palestinian Arab Bedouin.  
Without a doubt the Bedouin fell victim to the legal and political system. The Israeli 
state is ill-disposed toward the Bedouin and renders them as second-class citizens through 
systematic oppression. It is crucial to understand that the Bedouin can never be 
indemnified for their losses unless they are granted equality under citizenship. 
The Bedouin’s future does not seem to be bright. Despite their resistance, they are in 
fact slowly succumbing to the superiority of the Israeli state that is not only destroying 
their homes, but also their existence. 
We believe that raising awareness about the tragic Bedouin situation could trigger the 
international community to put pressure on Israel and act on behalf of the Bedouin who 
should be the beneficiaries of international protection. This could pave the way to end the 
ethnic cleansing of the Bedouin. 
 
Notes 
1. “The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Human Rights Dimensions of 
Population Transfer, Including the Implantation of Settlers,” U.N. ESCOR, Sub-Committee on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 45th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 8, 
at 85, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/17 (1993). 
2. The prime mover of Zionism was Theodor Herzl who, in 1897, conducted the First Zionism 
Congress which resulted in the establishment of the Zionism Organization. Their ideology is based 
on the Bible’s promise that ‘Holy Land’ is predestinated to Jewish people. The Zionism 
Organization in 1908 in Jafa set up Eretz Yisrael Office, which facilitated Jewish immigration and 
land purchases in Mandatory Palestine (Laqueur 2003: 15). 
3. The Six-Day War took place in 1967, when Israeli Forces began aggression on neighbouring 
countries Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. The war finished after six days of fighting during 5-10 June 
1967, with military success by Israeli forces. The ceasefire was signed a day after. In the 
aftermath, Israel began military occupation of The Gaza Strip, The Sinai Peninsula, The West 
Bank and the Golan Heights (Bukowska 1978: 433). 
4. Source - http://www.adalah.org/eng/intl06/un-i6-jnf.pdf, retrieved on 3 December 2011. 
5. The Ottoman Empire was a multinational empire which was then sustained by Islam until 1923 
and ruled over Palestine up until 1918. The British Mandate is a document passed by the League 
of Nations which granted Britain power over Palestine in 1923 (Krämer 2008). 
6. Al-Nakba is translated into Arabic as disaster or catastrophe. The 1948 al-Nakba occurred when 
approximately 711,000 - 725,000 Palestinian Arabs left, fled, or were expelled from their homes 
during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War (McDowall and Palley 1987). 
7. Retrieved from the Central Bureau of Statistics, at http://www.cbs.gov.il/shnaton61/st02_10x.pdf. 
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8. Resolution No. 2759 was passed on 11 November 2007; it obliged the Israeli government to have 
“Adequate representation of the Arab, Druze and Circassian population in government services” 
(Rotem and Noach 2011: 4). 
9. The information was obtained under the Freedom of Data law in the Civil Service Commission. 
The Commission provided data as to the number of Arabs employed in the southern district as well 
as the total number of employees distributed by Ministry and Civil Service rank and role. 
10. Retrieved from the Central Bureau of Statistics, at http://www.cbs.gov.il/shnaton61/st02_10x.pdf. 
11. Protection is granted under the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Persons, 
particularly in Article 10 where the Bedouin are recognized by the United Nations Permanent 
Forum on Indigenous Issues. 
12. Extract of the conference “Palestine: the search for a state” held at the Danish Institute for 
International Studies (DIIS) in Copenhagen on 24 November 2011. 
13. As stated by Nabil Shaath during the aforementioned conference, the one-state solution in Israel 
and West Bank is one of the suggested attempts, ideally the best, to resolve the Israeli Palestinian 
conflict. 
14. Source - http://www.wbez.org/episode-segments/2011-10-26/israel-plans-displace-30000-bedouin-
israeli-citizens-93501, retrieved on 6 November 2011. 
15. Palestinian grassroots resistant movement from 2000 to 2005 against Israeli policy of occupation 
and discrimination. 
 
References 
Abu-Rabia, A. (2002) “Negev Bedouin Displacement, Forced Settlement and Conservation,” in D. Chatty 
and M. Colchester (eds) Conservation and Mobile Indigenous Peoples: Displacement, Forced 
Settlement and Sustainable Development, Oxford: Berghahn Books, pp. 202-211. 
Abu-Ras, T. (2006) Land Disputes in Israel: The Case of the Bedouin of the Naqab, in Adalah’s 
Newsletter, Vol. 24, April, accessed 10 December 2011, at 
http://www.adalah.org/newsletter/eng/apr06/ar2.pdf.  
Almi, O. (2005) “The Ramifications of House Demolitions in Israel on the Mental Health of Children,” 
accessed 7 December 2011, at http://www.phr.org.il/uploaded/articlefile_1136475755945.doc. 
Appadurai, A. (2006) Fear of Small Numbers: An Essay on the Geography of Anger, Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press. 
Bell-Fialkoff, A. (1993) “A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing,” in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, 
Summer, pp. 110-121. 
Blecher, R. (2005) “Citizens without Sovereignty: Transfer and Ethnic Cleansing in Israel,” in Comparative 
Studies in Society and History, Vol. 47, No. 4, pp. 725-754. 
Blum, R., G. Stanton, S. Sagi, and E. Richter (2007) ‘‘Ethnic Cleansing’ bleaches the atrocities of 
genocide’, in European Journal of Public Health, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 147-68. 
Bukowska, A. (1978) Palestyńczycy ich życię i walka, Warsawa: Czytelnik. 
Castles, S. and M. Miller (2009) The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern 
World, 4th Revised Edition, London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Central Bureau of Statistics, “Statistical Abstract of Israel 2010,” accessed 8 December 2011, at 
http://www.cbs.gov.il/shnaton61/st02_10x.pdf. 
Fein, H. (2007) Human Rights and Wrongs: Slavery, Terror, Genocide, London: Paradigm Publishers. 
Finkelstein, I. and A. Perevolotsky (1990) ‘Processes of Sedentarization and Nomadization in the History 
of Sinai and the Negev’, in Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research, No. 279, August, pp. 
67-88. 
Gagnon, V.P. (2004) The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in 1990s, New York: Cornell University 
Press. 
Giddens, A. (1991) The Consequences of Modernity, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Goering, K. (1979) “Israel and the Bedouin of the Negev,” in Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1, 
pp. 3-20. 
Hansen, L. (2006) Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War, New York: Routledge. 
Harrison, R.P. (1993) Forests: The Shadow of Civilization, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Harvey, D. (2005) A Brief History of Neoliberalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kamil Qandil, Nicolò Di Marzo, and Katherine Walkiewicz                                     IJIS Vol. 8, No. 1, 2012 
 58 
Human Rights Watch (2001) Second Class: Discrimination Against Palestinian Arab Children in Israel’s 
Schools, New York: Human Rights Watch. 
Human Rights Watch (2008) Off the Map: Land and Housing Rights Violations in Israel’s Unrecognized 
Bedouin Villages, Vol. 20, No. 5 (E), March, New York: Human Rights Watch. 
Koeller, K. (2006) “The Bedouin of the Negev: A Forgotten Minority,” in Forced Migration Review, No. 
26, pp. 38-39. 
Krämer, G. (2008) A History of Palestine: From the Ottoman Conquest to the Founding of the State of 
Israel, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Laqueur, W. (2003) A History of Zionism, London: I.B. Tauris & Co. 
Mann, M. (2005) The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing, New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Marx, E. (1967) Bedouin of the Negev, Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
McDowall, D. and C. Palley (1987) “The Palestinians,” in Minority Rights Group Report, No. 24, pp. 10. 
Mulaj K. (2007) “Ethnic Cleansing and the Provision of In/Security,” in Security Dialogue, Vol. 38, No. 3, 
pp. 335-356. 
Pappe, I. (2006) The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, Oxford: Oneworld Publications. 
Piotrowski, J. (1983) Spór o Palestynę, Warsawa: Mon. 
Preece, J (1998) “Ethnic Cleansing as an Instrument of Nation-State Creation: Changing State Practices and 
Evolving Legal Norms,” in Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 817-842. 
Preston, P.W. (1996) “Decolonization, Cold War and the Construction of Modernization Theory,” in P.W. 
Preston (1996) Development Theory: An Introduction, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 153-178.  
Radwan, O. (2011) “Palestinian Bedouins threatened with ethnic cleansing,” in Middle East Monitor, 
accessed 15 September 2011, at http://www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/middle-east/2824-
palestinian-bedouins-threatened-with-ethnic-cleansing. 
Rotem, M. and H. Noach, (2011) “Structural Discrimination and Racism against Arab Employees in 
Government Offices in the Negev and Availability of Governmental Services in the Arab 
Communities,” State of Affairs, Prepared by the Negev Coexistence Forum for Civil Equality, accessed 
15 November 2011, at http://dukium.org/user_uploads/pdfs/Racism_Report-English_2011.pdf. 
Scott, J.C. (1998) Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have 
Failed, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Sherwood, H. (2011) “Academic claims Israeli school textbooks contain bias,” in The Guardian, accessed 
13 December 2011, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/07/israeli-school-racism-claim.  
The Negev Coexistence Forum for Civil Equality (2006) “The Arab-Bedouins of the Naqab-Negev Desert 
in Israel,” UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), accessed 5 December 
2011, at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/ngos/NCf-IsraelShadowReport.pdf. 
The Negev Coexistence Forum for Civil Equality (2009) “The Bedouin-Arabs in the Negev-Naqab Desert 
in Israel,” Shadow Report, Response to the Report of the State of Israel on Implementing the Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR), accessed 15 November 2011, at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/ngos/Negev_Coexistence_Forum_Civil_Equality.pdf. 
Waever, O. (1995) “Securitization and Desecuritization,” in R.D. Lipschutz (ed.) On Security, New York: 
Columbia University Press, pp. 46-86. 
Weiner, M. (1993) “Rejected Peoples and Unwanted Migrants in South Asia,” in Economic and Political 
Weekly, Vol. 28, No.34, pp. 1737-1746. 
Yiftachel, O. (2006) Ethnocracy: Land and Identity Politics in Israel/Palestine, Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press. 
Yonah, Y., I. Abu-Saad and A. Kaplan (2004) “De-Arabization of the Bedouin: A Study of an Inevitable 
Failure,” in Interchange, Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 387-406. 
 
